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CONSUMER PROTECTION OUT OF THE SHADOWS OF SHADOW 
BANKING:   
THE ROLE OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
 
David Reiss* 
Consumer protection remains the stepchild of financial 
regulation. Notwithstanding the fact that the economic doldrums we find 
ourselves in originated in the under-regulated subprime mortgage sector, 
relatively few academic commentators focus on the role that consumer 
protection can play in reducing such risks as well as in restoring the 
balance between consumer and producer in the financial markets. This 
essay suggests that consumer protection regulation has an important role 
to play in the regulatory structure of the shadow banking sector.  
This essay does four things. First, it describes the role of shadow 
banking in the residential mortgage market—the shadow mortgage 
banking sector, as it were. Second, it contrasts two mortgages. One is 
emblematic of shadow mortgage banking during the Subprime Boom. 
The other is Dodd-Frank’s response to the excesses of the Subprime 
Boom—the “Qualified Mortgage.” It then evaluates whether “Qualified 
Mortgages” can restrain some of shadow mortgage banking’s excesses, 
and finds that they may be able to do so. It concludes by reviewing the 
first steps taken by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as it 
begins implementing Dodd-Frank’s mortgage-related provisions. 
 
I. SHADOW MORTGAGE BANKING 
 The shadow mortgage banking system dwarfs the banking 
system’s role in the residential mortgage markets.1 A key component of 
the shadow banking2 system is the securitization of credit, 3 particularly 
                                                                                                                       
*
 Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Versions of this essay were presented at the The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau After One Year symposium at Brooklyn Law School on March 
2, 2012 and the Shadow Banking symposium at the Boston University School of Law on February 24, 
2012.  The author would like to thank participants of the symposiums for their comments. KeAupuni 
Akina provided excellent research assistance. 
1
 Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and Its Legal Origins 31 (Aug. 23, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990816. 
2
 I use here Schwarcz’s broad definition of shadow banks: “non-banks [that] provide financial 
products and services.” Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, __REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L.__, 4 (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1993185. 
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of residential mortgages.4 However, shadow banking institutions that 
originated residential mortgages, particularly subprime mortgages, were 
much less regulated than banking institutions that had the same line of 
business.5 As a result, they were less constrained by consumer protection 
regulations.6 They were also able to lower their underwriting standards 
in order to increase their market share.7 
This weaker underwriting could be seen in the proliferation of 
exotic mortgage products that  
(i) did not require a down payment;  
(ii) allowed for negative amortization8; and  
(iii) had no-doc verification of income and assets for 
underwriting purposes, the notorious “liar loan.”9 
                                                                                                                       
Others prefer more limited definitions. See, e.g., ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 458, SHADOW BANKING 11 (2010) (defining shadow banks as “financial 
intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation without access to central bank 
liquidity or public sector credit guarantees”); Bernard S. Sharfman, Using the Law to Reduce Systemic 
Risk, 36 J. CORP. L. 607, 609 n.8 (2011) (defining shadow banking as “unregulated financial 
intermediation”). 
3
 Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 5 (observing that “a large part of what is considered in today’s 
markets to be structured finance involves securitization”). 
4
 TOBIAS ADRIAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 533, DODD-FRANK ONE 
YEAR ON: IMPLICATIONS FOR SHADOW BANKING 1 (2011). 
5
 See David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to 
Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 997 (2006) [hereinafter 
Reiss, Subprime Standardization]; see also GARY GORTON & ANDREW METRICK, REGULATING THE 
SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM 1 (2010). 
6
 Id. Reiss, Subprime Standardization, supra note 5, at 997.  See also JASON HSU & MAX MOROZ, 
RESEARCH AFFILIATES LLC, SHADOW BANKS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007-2008 7 (2010), 
available at http://ssrn.comabstract=1574970. Additionally, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
found that shadow banking has many “bank-like financial activities that are conducted outside the 
traditional commercial banking system, many of which are unregulated or lightly regulated.” 
Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 13 (citing FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY STAFF 
REPORT: SHADOW BANKING AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 7 (2010), available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/2010-0505-Shadow-Banking.pdf). 
7
 See Adam J. Levitin et al., The Dodd-Frank Act and Housing Finance: Can It Restore Private 
Risk Capital to the Securitization Market?, __ YALE J. ON REG. __, 5 (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970288 (“Lacking a stake in the performance of mortgages, securitizers were 
willing to securitize poorly underwritten loans.”). 
8
 “Negative amortization” refers to loans for which the principal amount of the loan increases over 
the term of the loan despite timely payments by the borrower. See Reiss, Subprime Standardization, 
supra note 5, at 1028. 
9
 ADRIAN, supra note 4. 
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These exotic mortgages allowed lenders to lend to many borrowers who 
did not have the credit profile of the traditional prime borrower.10  
Secondary market shadow bankers encouraged this phenomenon 
partially because a bigger consumer pipeline meant more mortgage-
backed securities underwriting and thus more fees.11 But they also 
encouraged it because subprime mortgages could generate higher profits 
than comparable prime mortgages because of their significantly higher 
interest rates and more opaque pricing.12 
During the early 2000s, the shadow mortgage banking sector 
appeared to excel at providing inexpensive funding by taking illiquid and 
in some cases risky and confusing individual mortgages and converting 
them into liquid, investment grade, fungible securities.13 But while the 
shadow mortgage banking sector appeared to convert illiquid mortgages 
into liquid investments, it in fact did the opposite by "fund[ing] illiquid 
assets with short-term liabilities,” creating a liquidity mismatch that is 
prone to runs, much like bank runs.14 Because that process of 
securitization was built on a faulty foundation, it contributed in no small 
part to the Subprime Boom and Bust.15  
The systemic problem with the subprime sector’s origination 
practices was not just that they were originating mortgages that were 
more likely to default.16 Underwriting standards for securitized pools can 
address this concern if the higher rates of default are predictable.17 The 
                                                                                                                       
10
 Gerding, supra note 1, at 30. 
11
 See Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation 
and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1366-67 (2009). 
12
 Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 123, 126, 140-43 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=952907. 
13
 POZSAR, supra note 2, at 14. 
14
 See HSU & MOROZ, supra note 6, at 7. A “bank run” occurs when a bank’s depositors withdraw 
their deposits from a bank because they fear it is insolvent.  Because even healthy banks keep only a 
small percentage of their deposits on hand, a bank run can ruin even a healthy bank. 
15
 See id. at 7, 11-18 (describing the role of shadow banking in the 2008/2009 financial crisis 
16
 KRISTOPHER S. GERARDI ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, NO. 09-1, MAKING SENSE OF 
THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2009/ppdp0901.pdf (subprime mortgage “[l]oans originated 
with less than complete documentation of income or assets, and particularly those originated with both 
high leverage and incomplete documentation, exhibited sharper rises in defaults than other loans”). 
17
 See id. at 2 (suggesting that the ability to accurately predict rates of default would have helped to 
curb lax underwriting and rating standards leading up to the subprime credit boom).  
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thornier problem, from a mortgage-backed securities underwriting 
perspective, is that market participants did not understand how risky 
those mortgages were and how rapidly the risk profile of mortgage 
products originated by many shadow banking institutions changed.18 In 
other words, underwriters and rating agencies had no baseline from 
which they could establish reliable default rates for all of the new 
products that were originated during the Boom.19 Many other academics 
have called for increased regulation of the shadow banking sector in 
order to secure its foundation.20 But few have focused on the role of 
consumer protection regulation as part of that new foundation.21 
 
II. A TALE OF TWO MORTGAGES22 
The following tale of two mortgages provides a good context for 
understanding the role of consumer protection in shadow banking 
regulation. One of my most striking memories from the height of the 
Subprime Boom involves a phone call from a reporter for the WALL 
STREET JOURNAL. He wanted me to comment on a particular type of high 
interest mortgage marketed by a national lender.  
                                                                                                                       
18
 See POZSAR, supra note 2, at 3; Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 17, 19; see also Tobias ADRIAN & 
ADAM B. ASHCRAFT, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 559, SHADOW BANKING 
REGULATION 7-8, 50 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2043153 (likening the breakdown 
of reliable creditworthiness information to a game of telephone where each step of transformation 
process made it difficult for investors to understand their risk exposure). 
19
 See POZSAR, supra note 2, at 3; see also Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 18. 
20
 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 26-27 (regulation of shadow banking may require a holistic 
approach that includes other agencies because shadow banking effects various regulatory agencies that 
may oversee banks, securities, or derivatives); GORTON & METRICK, supra note 5, at 21-23 (arguing 
that securitization is merely another form of banking and so functions of shadow banking that are 
similar to bank functions should be similarly regulated). 
21
 Some of those who have include Kathleen Engel, Patricia McCoy, Adam Levitin and Erik 
Gerding. See, e.g., KATHLEEN ENGEL & PATRICIA MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, 
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011) ; Adam Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency, Pew Financial Reform Project, Briefing Paper #2 (2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447082; Erik Gerding, The Subprime Crisis and the Link Between Consumer 
Financial Protection and Systemic Risk, 5 FIU L. REV. 93 (2009), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=erik_gerding. 
22
 This and the following part are drawn from David Reiss, Message In A Mortgage: What Dodd-
Frank’s “Qualified Mortgage” Tells Us About Ourselves, 31 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. __ , 3-9 
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018940 [hereinafter Reiss, Message in a 
Mortgage]. 
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The mortgage came with a two-year teaser cap on loan payments 
(not on the interest rate mind you—on the payments!). It also had a 
three-year prepayment penalty period. This can create a perfect storm for 
a borrower, particularly for an unsophisticated one. For once the 
artificially low payments of the two-year teaser period end, the borrower 
might find it difficult to make her payments on the loan.  
Now, remember that the mortgage has a prepayment penalty. If 
the borrower tries to refinance from this high interest rate product to a 
more appropriate one after the two-year teaser cap is lifted, she will be 
forced to pay a prepayment penalty. That is because the prepayment 
penalty period lasts for three years, a year longer than the teaser cap on 
payments. This ensures that the lender wins—one way or another.  
Let’s turn to another species of mortgage, Dodd Frank’s 
“Qualified Mortgage,” as well as its statutory sibling, the “Qualified 
Residential Mortgage.”23 Dodd-Frank tries to reduce the risk of a 
systemic failure by regulating the quality of mortgages that are 
securitized by banks and shadow banks.24 The “Qualified Mortgage” is 
one that is privileged in Dodd-Frank in order to incentivize lenders to 
originate them instead of other types of mortgages.25  
                                                                                                                       
23
 The definition for a “Qualified Residential Mortgage” can be no broader than the definition of a 
“Qualified Mortgage.” Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 941, 124 Stat. 1376, 1895 (2010) (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].  
24
 Dodd-Frank enacts enhanced supervision and prudential standards for nonbank financial 
companies for the following purpose: 
(1) PURPOSE.—In order to prevent or mitigate risks to the financial stability of the United 
States that could arise from the material financial distress, failure, or ongoing activities of 
large, interconnected financial institutions, the Council may make recommendations to the 
Board of Governors concerning the establishment and refinement of prudential standards 
and reporting and disclosure requirements applicable to nonbank financial companies 
supervised by the Board of Governors and large, interconnected bank holding companies, 
that—  
(A) are more stringent than those applicable to other nonbank financial companies and 
bank holding companies that do not present similar risks to the financial stability of the 
United States; and  
(B) increase in stringency, based on the considerations identified in subsection (b)(3). 
Dodd-Frank Act § 115(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1403 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5324). Cf. Bernard S. 
Sharfman, Using the Law to Reduce Systemic Risk, 36 J. CORP. L. 607, 609-10, 615 (2011), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711927 (arguing that systemic risk should be reduced but not eliminated 
because it is a necessary byproduct of a successful economy). 
25
 See generally Dodd-Frank Act § 1412, 124 Stat. 2145-48. The Dodd-Frank Act requires that the 
Bureau promulgate rules relating to “Qualified Mortgages.” Id. 
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The “Qualified Mortgage” provides lenders with a safe harbor 
from certain provisions of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) as well as 
from Dodd-Frank’s mandatory “ability to repay” underwriting 
standards.26 The net effect is to create a kind of “plain vanilla” mortgage 
option that lenders will want to originate because they pose fewer 
regulatory and litigation risks.27  
This plain vanilla option is meant to crowd out a number of 
abusive practices that sprang up during the Subprime Boom. While not 
labeled explicitly, the elements of the “Qualified Mortgage” definition 
are tied to notorious mortgage products. 
The first elements bars negatively amortizing mortgages. The 
second bars liar loans.28 The third bars balloon payments which protects 
borrowers from payment shock.29 The fourth bars underwriting based on 
                                                                                                                       
26
 Id. The “safe harbor” is a rebuttable presumption that a “Qualified Mortgage” meets Section 
1411 of the Dodd-Frank Act’s “ability to repay” standards. Id.; see generally id. § 1411(a)(2), 124 Stat. 
2142 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)). FHA and GSE-insured loans are exempt from the “skin 
in the game requirements.” See id. § 941(b) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 75o-l1(c)(1)(G)(ii)) 
(requiring that several government agencies promulgate “a total or partial exemption” for FHA and 
GSE-insured loans, thus excluding the loans from the “credit risk retention requirements”). A 
“Qualified Residential Mortgage,” on the other hand:  
defines which loans will be exempt from requirements that at least five percent of the credit 
risk be retained by the securitizer. While the [“Qualified Mortgage”] ‘ability to repay’ 
obligation will apply to all residential mortgages, the [“Qualified Residential Mortgage”] 
definition will apply only to mortgages that are privately securitized. 
ROBERT G. QUERCIA ET. AL, BALANCING RISK AND ACCESS: UNDERWRITING STANDARDS FOR 
QUALIFIED RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES 2-3, UNC CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CAPITAL AND CENTER 
FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (2012), available at 
http://www.ccc.unc.edu/documents/QRM%20Underwriting.3.2012.pdf. 
27
 John Pottow, Ability to Pay, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 175, 175-76 (2011). The definitions of 
“Qualified Mortgage” and “Qualified Residential Mortgage” bring back to life the “plain vanilla” 
mortgage option that had been heatedly debated before the Dodd-Frank Act was adopted but had been 
rejected in its original incarnation. Id. 
28
 See Joe Nocera, In Prison for Taking a Liar Loan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at B1 (describing 
consumer convicted for fraud on applications for “stated-income loans,” the formal term for “liar 
loans”).  
29
 “Balloon payments” are loans where “monthly payments are lower but one large payment (the 
balloon payment) is due when the loan matures. Predatory loans may contain a balloon payment that 
the borrower is unlikely to be able to afford . . . [s]ometimes, lenders market a low monthly payment 
without adequate disclosure of the balloon payment.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER 
PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 
19 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf [hereinafter GAO, CONSUMER 
PROTECTION].  
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teaser and adjustable interest rates, again to limit payment shock.30 The 
fifth bars equity-based lending.31 The sixth limits high points and fees to 
limit equity stripping.32 And the seventh limits mortgage terms to 30 
years to reduce the likelihood of a borrower being caught in an endless 
cycle of debt.33 
 
III. THE ROAD AHEAD 
Can this new regulatory approach to shadow mortgage banking 
succeed? It does face a lot of challenges at both the origination level as 
well as the securitization level. It says that paternalism is appropriate in 
some contexts. It limits the flexibility of parties to modify a mortgage 
when compared to how society regulates goods and services generally. It 
may restrict credit needlessly. And it may be irrelevant.  
A. Paternalistic 
It had long been the view among economists that consumer 
protection is paternalistic to the extent that consumers are rational.34 
                                                                                                                       
30
 “[P]ayment shock is the percentage increase (or decrease) in the monthly payment relative to the 
payment in the previous year.” Brent W. Ambrose, et al., A Note on Hybrid Mortgages, 33 REAL ESTATE 
ECONOMICS 765, 773 (2005), available at 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/211136095/fulltextPDF/137AB7514A85A01F617/8?accountid=37
371. 
31
 “Equity-based lending” is a type of mortgage lending where “lenders make loans based on the 
amount of the homeowner’s equity, even if it may appear that the borrower has insufficient income to 
make monthly payments,” and often without regard for the borrower’s ability to repay the loan. Baher 
Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Laboratories of Experimentation, 
57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 337 (2005), available at http://www.floridalawreview.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/01/NEW-Azmy-BOOK.pdf. 
32
 See GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 29 (“Mortgage originators may refinance 
borrowers’ loans repeatedly in a short period of time without any economic gain for the borrower. With 
each successive refinancing, these originators charge high fees that ‘strip’ borrowers’ equity in their 
homes.”).  
33
 Dodd-Frank Act § 1412, 124 Stat. 2145-46 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(viii)); 
see Message in a Mortgage, supra  note 22 for a more detailed treatment.  “Qualified Mortgages” also 
have a limitation on prepayment penalties. Id. § 1414(a), 124 Stat. 2149 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
1639c(c)(4)). Qualified Mortgage prepayment penalties must be no greater than three percent and must 
phase out over a three-year period. Id. This provision also reduces the opportunities for equity 
stripping. 
34
 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15–17 (3d ed. 1986). Public 
choice theorists might characterize consumer protection regulation in even worse terms: it is the 
product of rent-seekers who hope to gain favorable regulations to benefit themselves and who may 
couch the regulations in consumer protection garb in order to make it more palatable politically. See 
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Behavioral economics has challenged this notion, demonstrating that 
consumers can behave in predictably irrational (and indeed, in some 
cases, in rationally ignorant) ways.35 The Subprime Bust has made 
paternalism much easier to swallow as a policy choice because so many 
have made such spectacularly bad choices. And behavioral economics 
has provided a theoretical justification for paternalistic government 
policies that some had found lacking until recently. 
B. Limits Flexibility 
It is well established that rules-based regulation is less flexible 
than a standards-based approach or an unfettered market for that 
matter.36 The definition of a “Qualified Mortgage” surely falls within the 
scope of rules-based regulation, with its bars on numerous mortgage 
characteristics.37 The Dodd-Frank Act did, however, build significant 
regulatory flexibility into its regulation of mortgages. Dodd-Frank 
authorizes regulators to “prescribe regulations that revise, add to, or 
subtract from the criteria that define a qualified mortgage . . .”38 It 
remains to be seen whether regulators will be nimble enough to deploy 
such flexibility, but the option is certainly there.  
C. Restricts Credit 
Consumer advocates and real estate industry trade groups argue 
that strict underwriting criteria contained in the proposed “Qualified 
Residential Mortgage” definition will restrict credit to many who could 
benefit from it because of its high down payment requirements.39 
                                                                                                                       
generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (setting forth a theory of public choice). 
35
 See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 39 (1980). 
36
 See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 257,  (1974) (“A rule withdraws from the decision maker’s consideration one or more of the 
circumstances that would be relevant to decision according to a standard”). 
37
 Dodd-Frank § 1412 (defining “Qualifying Mortgage”). See supra text accompanying note 33. 
38
 Dodd-Frank § 1412(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e) (allowing 
Federal banking agencies and SEC to adopt exemptions, exceptions and adjustments to “skin in the 
game” requirements). 
39
 COAL. FOR SENSIBLE HOUS. POLICY, PROPOSED QRM DEFINITION HARMS CREDITWORTHY 
BORROWERS WHILE FRUSTRATING HOUSING RECOVERY 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/regulators/Coalition-QRM-
White-Paper-1.pdf. The Coalition argues that “once you apply the strong underwriting standards in the 
sample QRM definition, moving from a 5 percent to a 10 percent down payment requirement reduces 
the overall default experience by an average of only two- to three-tenths of one percent for each cohort 
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Finding the right balance between responsible underwriting and access to 
credit is, of course, key. But again, Dodd-Frank has the flexibility to 
achieve that result. 
D. Possibly Irrelevant 
The “Qualified Mortgage” and its statutory sibling, the 
“Qualified Residential Mortgage,” also face serious challenges in the 
secondary mortgage market. The “Qualified Mortgage” and “Qualified 
Residential Mortgage” definitions may be too narrow such that they will 
not crowd out less consumer-friendly mortgage products from the 
market.40 The definitions could be too broad such that they allow in 
many risky mortgage products.41 Both paths could lead to a return to a 
mortgage market where abusive lending practices return with a 
vengeance and pose systemic risk to the financial system. Finally, the 
definitions could be just so lousy that they could lead to a dormant 
mortgage market, with a concomitant catatonic housing market. Thus, a 
key question is whether the definitions achieve a sweet spot among the 
approaches that could be taken.42 
 
IV. THE BUREAU’S AGENDA 
The agenda of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the 
Bureau) has begun to take shape. The Bureau is the new agency created 
by Dodd-Frank that has much of the authority over Dodd-Frank’s 
                                                                                                                       
year. However, the increase in the minimum down payment from 5 percent to 10 percent would 
eliminate from 4 to 7 percent of borrowers from qualifying for a lower rate QRM loan.” Id. at 6. 
40
 Levitin et al., supra note 7, at 11. Many argue that narrow “Qualified Mortgage” and “Qualified 
Residential Mortgage” definitions will be detrimental to the growth of the mortgage market. See 
QUERCIA ET AL., supra note 26, at 6, 10, 27-29, 33-35 (arguing that stringent underwriting 
requirements for “Qualified Mortgages” will provide a small increase in foreclosure reduction at the 
cost of significant restrictions in credit access for low to middle-income borrowers); see also Raymond 
Natter, Congressional Intent Regarding the Qualified Mortgage Provision, 98 BANKING REP. (BNA) 
921 (May 22, 2012) (discussing Congressional concern that a narrow definition will result in 
unanticipated restrictions in “mortgage credit availability for traditional loans,” and that a narrow 
definition will prevent regulation from keeping up with financial products developed in the future).  
41
 Levitin et al., supra note 7, at 11. A related question is whether regulators can keep up with 
market participants as they attempt to circumvent the spirit of the regulations while complying with 
their letter. See Richard Hynes & Eric Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 162, 198 (2002). 
42
 See Levitin et al., supra note 7, at 23. 
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mortgage-related provisions.43 The Bureau’s Assistant Director for 
Regulations, Leonard N. Chanin, stated that the “bulk of the [Bureau]’s 
activities” in 2012 will be occupied by providing guidance regarding 
mortgage statutes and rulemaking.44 The most important initiatives will 
be finalizing the rules for Dodd-Frank’s “ability to repay” and “Qualified 
Mortgages” provisions.45 Chanin also noted that “[p]retty much the 
entire mortgage arena as we know it will be covered by the rules . . . 
[and] a lot of future rule makings really hinge on the adoption of these 
rules because they are so broad in terms of the mortgage market.”46  
The Bureau’s agenda for residential mortgage regulation can be 
inferred from its various proposed rulemakings, requests for comments, 
and consumer initiatives. The Bureau is clearly focusing on broadly 
accepted forms of consumer protection such as disclosure requirements 
and consumer education that address information asymmetries in the 
financial markets. It is also promulgating paternalistic regulations that set 
up bright line rules for products and behavior in the mortgage market and 
is complementing such regulations with closer supervision for formerly 
under-regulated mortgage market actors—the shadow mortgage banking 
sector.  
This section will provide a brief overview of the Bureau’s 
activities thus far and its agenda for the immediate future with regard to 
home mortgage lending regulation. A preliminary evaluation indicates 
that the Bureau is balancing increased regulation with regulatory 
flexibility, implicitly acknowledging that such flexibility is necessary for 
a properly functioning market. Such an approach bodes well for 
consumers. As such it may also bode well for a reduction in systemic 
risk in this sector of the financial industry, the sector that gave us the 
Subprime Crisis.  This is because that crisis demonstrated that a large 
sector of the consumer economy can go off the rails for quite some time 
before the financial markets take note.  To the extent that consumer 
protection keeps a sector from doing so, it can reduce systemic risk. 
                                                                                                                       
43
 Dodd-Frank Act § 1400, 124 Stat. 2136 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481) (the Dodd-Frank 
Act names the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act as an enumerated consumer law 
which falls under the purview of the Bureau). 
44
 Stephen Joyce, Official: CFPB Will Exert Bulk of Rule-Writing Efforts in 2012 on Mortgage-
Related Rules, 98 BANKING REP. (BNA) 136 (Jan. 24, 2012). 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. 
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A. Disclosure 
Disclosure requirements are designed to reduce information 
asymmetries between consumers and producers. Disclosure requirements 
are accepted across the political spectrum.47  Nonetheless, it is unclear 
how effective disclosure requirements are and whether the Bureau’s 
efforts in this regard will be more successful than those that have come 
before.48 
The Bureau is working to increase transparency and the exchange 
of information between borrowers and lenders through two initiatives. 
First, the Bureau is developing a consolidated mortgage loan disclosures 
proposal to consolidate mortgage loan disclosures and related rules under 
the Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures 
Act.49 As a part of the Bureau’s Know Before You Owe initiative, the 
Bureau will combine the Truth in Lending Disclosure with the HUD-1 
Settlement Statement that lenders give to consumers taking out loans to 
purchase a home or refinance a mortgage.50 The Bureau is currently in 
the final rounds of testing and soliciting comments on their proposed 
Loan Estimate and Settlement Disclosure forms.51 
                                                                                                                       
47
 Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 
"Asymmetric Paternalism, 151 PENNSYLVANIA L. REV., 1211, 1232-33 (2003) (noting ubiquity and 
benefits of disclosure in consumer protection context). 
48
 See generally Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of 
Predatory Lending, 65 MARYLAND L. REV. 707 (2006) (arguing that mandatory disclosure may be 
insufficient to overcome consumer decisionmaking heuristics). 
49
 Dodd-Frank Act § 1032(f), 124 Stat. 2007 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5532); Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, Fall 2011 Statement of Regulatory Priorities, CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulations/fall-2011-statement-of-regulatory-priorities/ (last visited 
May 24, 2012) [hereinafter Regulatory Priorities]. 
50
 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Know Before You Owe, CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyouowe/ (last visited may 24, 2012).  The HUD-1 “is a 
document that lists all charges and credits to a buyer and to the seller in a real estate settlement.” 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, What is a HUD-1?, CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/178/what-is-a-hud-1.html (last visited June 19, 2012). 
51
 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Know Before You Owe: The Last Dance…or Is It?, 
CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/know-before-you-owe-the-last-
dance-or-is-it/ (last visited June 5, 2012). The Loan Estimate form is a disclosure form given to 
consumers detailing the loan terms, projected payments, closing cost details, comparisons with other 
loans, and other relevant considerations. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, LOAN ESTIMATE 
FORM, CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/02/20120220_cfpb_tupelo-
loan-estimate.pdf (providing sample Loan Estimate form). The Settlement Disclosure form is a 
statement of final loan terms and closing costs.  CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 
SETTLEMENT DISCLOSURE FORM, CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV, 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/02/20120220_cfpb_basswood-settlement-disclosure.pdf 
(providing sample Settlement Disclosure form). 
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The Bureau is also proposing new rules relating to the servicing 
of mortgages.52 These proposals include requirements for clearer 
mortgage statements; clear warnings before the interest rates on ARMs 
adjust; options for avoiding lender-imposed ‘force-placed’ property 
insurance; and lender options for avoiding foreclosure.53 The proposals 
also include requirements that mortgage payments be immediately 
credited; payment records be kept as up-to-date and as accessible as 
possible, given the size of the servicer; errors be corrected as quickly as 
possible; and foreclosure prevention teams be maintained by the 
servicer.54 
Finally, the Bureau is issuing, pursuant to Dodd-Frank, a monthly 
mortgage statement form,55 which is intended to assist consumers in 
appropriate budgeting.56 The form will include information about key 
current loan terms (principal amount and interest rate) and key 
information about the mortgage, such as the reset date for adjustable rate 
mortgages and the amount of any late or prepayment fees. Finally, it 
contains information about how to contact housing counselors if the 
homeowner is in financial distress. 57  
It is encouraging to note that the Bureau is testing its new 
disclosure forms.  But the Bureau has not yet made clear whether it will 
be testing them once they are adopted.  Only ongoing testing will 
determine whether improved disclosures will actually have a systemic 
impact on consumer choices.58 
                                                                                                                       
52
 For a summary of the CFPB’s proposals in this area see CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION 
BUREAU, PUTTING THE ‘SERVICE’ BACK IN MORTGAGE SERVICING: NO SURPRISE, NO RUNAROUNDS, 
CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV (2012),  http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201204_cfpb_factsheet_putting-
service-back-in-mortgage-servicing.pdf [hereinafter NO SURPRISE]. For a more detailed description of 
the CFPB’s proposals see CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW 
PANEL FOR MORTGAGE SERVICING RULEMAKING, CFPB, OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS UNDER 
CONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED (April 9, 2012), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201204_cfpb_small-business-review-outline_mortgage-servicing-
rulemaking.pdf. 
53
 See NO SURPRISE, supra note 52, at 2-3. 
54
 See id. at 3-4. 
55
 Dodd-Frank Act § 1420, 124 Stat. 2156. 
56
 See Whitney Patross, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, A MODEL FORM FOR 
MORTGAGE STATEMENTS, CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/a-model-
form-for-mortgage-statements/ (last visited on June 1, 2012). The prototype form is available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/02/20120213_cfpb_draft-periodic-mortgage-statement.pdf. 
57
 See Patross, supra note 56. 
58
 See generally Willis, supra note 48. 
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B. Education 
Some, including the Bureau leadership, believe that financial 
education for consumers is key to consumer protection because better 
educated consumers make better informed loan decisions.59 Others are 
more skeptical.60  The Bureau provides mortgage payment and 
foreclosure prevention advice on its website.61 The Bureau’s website also 
provides referrals to local foreclosure prevention resources and 
specialized assistance for servicemen and veterans.62 As these measures 
are still in their infancy, the jury is still out as to whether these education 
efforts will improve outcomes for individuals and the financial system. 
And as with the disclosure initiatives described above, ongoing empirical 
testing will be key to demonstrating the impact of consumer education 
initiatives. 
C. Bright Line Rules and Increased Supervision 
Government-run consumer protection regimes premised on bright 
line rules are vulnerable to evasion by nimble, profit-maximizing private 
sector actors.63  Nonetheless, many of the worst excesses of the 
Subprime Boom arose from a small number of underwriting innovations 
such as “equity based lending” and “liar loans.”  Dodd-Frank, as 
implemented by the Bureau, bans some of the worst of these 
                                                                                                                       
59
 See, e.g., CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, BUILDING THE CFPB: A PROGRESS 
REPORT 19 (2011), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/07/Report_BuildingTheCfpb1.pdf (“This division provides, 
through a variety of initiatives and methods, information to consumers that will allow them to make the 
decisions that are best for them. Consumer education is a central mission of the Bureau.”). 
60
 Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 201 (2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105384 (“The gulf between the literacy levels of most 
Americans and that required to assess the plethora of credit, insurance, and investment products sold 
today - and new products as they are invented tomorrow - realistically will not be bridged.”). 
61
 Mortgage Help, CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/mortgagehelp/ 
(last visited May 23, 2012). 
62
 Id. 
63
 See Posner & Hynes, supra  note  41, at 197-98 (2002) (“it is not clear how much the law would 
influence the behavior of even a rational, well-informed consumer, given the many loopholes, the 
limited penalty structures, and the many ways in which creditors can evade the law and creditors and 
debtors can contract around it.”). 
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“innovations” and incentivizes the private sector to use some of the 
others much less frequently than they did in the Boom.  As with the 
disclosure and education initiatives, it remains to be seen how effective 
this approach will be. 
One of the most important tasks for the Bureau in this regard is to 
finalize the hotly debated definitions for “Qualified Mortgages” and 
“Qualified Residential Mortgages” discussed above.64  The Bureau has 
also expanded its regulatory authority by extending supervision from 
banking institutions to nonbanks.65 The Bureau will assess whether 
nonbanks are in violation of federal consumer financial laws including 
TILA and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA).66 This will be 
accomplished by employing a risk-based nonbank supervision program 
that focuses on risks posed to consumers.67 The Bureau has issued a 
proposal for public comment68 describing procedures that will allow it to 
“notify a nonbank firm that it is being considered for supervision 
because the bureau ‘may have reasonable cause’ to determine that the 
financial products or services offered pose risks to consumers.”69 While 
these notifications do not constitute charges for an alleged consumer 
protection violation, they are a way for the Bureau to reach nonbanks 
and notify them that they are being individually supervised by the 
Bureau.70 
The Bureau has also expanded its regulatory scope by issuing 
notices to the mortgage loan industry regarding regulation and advised 
practices. For example, Director Cordray has stated that the Bureau will 
                                                                                                                       
64
 See Regulatory Priorities, supra note 49. 
65
 Peggy Twohig & Steve Antonakes, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, The CFPB launches 
Its Nonbank Supervision Program, CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/the-cfpb-launches-its-nonbank-supervision-program/ (last 
visited May 23, 2012) (“the CFPB has authority to oversee nonbank businesses, regardless of size, in 
certain markets: mortgage companies (originators, brokers, and servicers, and loan modification or 
foreclosure relief services); payday lenders; and private education lenders”). 
66
 Id. 
67
 Nonbank examinations will be the same as bank examinations, which include requiring 
nonbanks to file certain reports; reviewing materials companies use to offer products and services; 
reviewing compliance systems and procedures; and reviewing promises made to consumers. Id. 
68
 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 12 C.F.R. § 1091 (2012), available at 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201205_cfpb_nprm_procedure-to-establish-nonbank-supervisory-
authority.pdf. 
69
 Mike Ferullo, Consumer Bureau Lays Out Procedures For Notifying Nonbank Firms of 
Supervision, 98 BANKING REP. (BNA) 941 (May 29, 2012). 
70
 Id. 
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apply the disparate impact doctrine, or “effects test” when enforcing 
ECOA.71  
Finally, the Bureau has acknowledged that flexibility is essential 
to a properly functioning market. This doctrine is reflected in the 
Bureau’s efforts to address concerns particular to non-bank and smaller 
banking entities.72 It has also manifested a sensitivity to concerns about 
over-regulation. This has been seen in its willingness to adapt to 
changing market realities as seen in the Bureau’s final regulations 
regarding Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C).73 
As noted above, the Bureau has to walk a fine line between 
protecting consumers from poor choices on the one hand and limiting 
consumer choice on the other.  If it goes too far in one direction, it can 
reduce access to credit.  If it goes too far in the other, it can leave 
consumers to fend for themselves against rapacious lenders in a 
predatory market.  The stakes for homeowners and the housing sector are 
as high as can be.  But the broader impact is also of great consequence, 
given the role that housing and residential construction play in the 
overall economy.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
While the initial signals are positive, the jury is still out on how 
effective the Dodd-Frank consumer protection regime, as implemented 
by the Bureau, will be in protecting homeowners and promoting a 
vibrant market for residential mortgages.  Nonetheless, the role of 
                                                                                                                       
71
 Richard Cordray, Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Keynote Address at the 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition (April 18, 2012), available at 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speeches/prepared-remarks-by-richard-cordray/; see also CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB BULLETIN REGARDING LENDING DISCRIMINATION (April 
18, 2012), CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV, 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201404_cfpb_bulletin_lending_discrimination.pdf. 
72
 The Bureau has established an Office for Community Banks and Credit Unions: “to ensure that 
the Bureau incorporates the perspectives of small depository institutions into our policy-making 
process; to communicate relevant policy initiatives to community banks and credit unions; and to work 
with community banks and credit unions to identify potential areas for regulatory simplification.” 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Community Banks and Credit Unions, 
CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/small-financial-services-providers/ (last 
visited May 23, 2012). 
73
 12 C.F.R. § 1003 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-02-15/pdf/2012-
3460.pdf.  Mortgage lenders in metropolitan areas with assets of $41 million or less are exempt from 
requirement to collect data about their housing-related lending activities. Id. 
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consumer protection should always be front and center in discussions of 
shadow mortgage banking regulation.  It is essential to healthy markets 
for the origination and securitization of residential mortgages. And it is 
essential to the legitimacy and functioning of the financial system 
overall. And past experience has shown that we leave it in the shadows at 
our peril. 
